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Rationalizing Entity Law: Corporate Law and Alternative Entities (Part 11)
By oar MaedII minv'ay

Corporations and unincorporated entities
exist to promote business by giving business venturers (entrepreneurs, promoters,
and financial backers) standard, legally ordained structures to govern their business
activities in a manner that is consonant with
their reasonable expectations. A successful
choice of entity involves gauging the reasonable expectations of the venturers and
matching them as closely as possible to the
operative rules and norms of a form of entity (as the same may be modified, of course,
by valid agreements between or among the
venturers). As Mark Loewenstein notes in

century will be to consider whether the legal differences among these [corporations
and alternative] entities makes sense and,
if not, how the law should be harmonized."
I agree.
Yet, I think there is more to rationalizing than harmonization, and my reading of
Mark's article leads me to believe that he
does, too. For me, rationalization is a process - a consideration of parallel rules from
the different forms of entity in light of underlying policy and applicable theory. My
purpose in this article is to offer preliminary thoughts on that process by consider-

der Subchapter XIV of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) - and other
closely held corporations often are given
more leeway to agree around rules than
those in other corporations. Under corporate law, modifications to statutory default
rules often must be made in specified documents. Corporate statutes are replete with
clauses like "unless the [the corporate charter - denominated articles of incorporation
under the Model Business Corporation Act
(MBCA) and a certificate of incorporation
under the DGCL] [the bylaws] [a valid
shareholder agreement] provide other-

his conclusion to Part I of this set of two

ing how corporate law and limited liability

wise, . . ." For example, Section 7.21 of the

entity rationalization articles, forms of entity have proliferated over the past 50 years,
offering venturers more refined choices. At
some point, one must wonder (as one of
my students recently did) whether we now
have too many forms of entity; whether the
costs associated with choice of entity now
exceed the benefits.
This pair of articles does not take on
that argument directly. But the entity rationalization debate is borne of many of
the same concerns, and thoughtful entity
rationalization may lead to the conclusion
that we are best off paring back the number
of statutory entities to a more manageable
number with more distinct rules grounded
in policy objectives and relevant theory. As
Mark observes, "the challenge of the 21st

company (LLC) law address two key areas
of entity law: freedom of contract and fiduciary duties. Like Mark, I will bring in
partnership law when relevant or insightful.

MBCA states that ". . . unless the articles

Freedom of Contract
While entity laws do include immutable
rules (e.g., those governing entity formation), much of corporate and unincorporated business association law consists of
default rules - rules that the constituents
can agree around (often, but not always, in
ways specified in the statutes themselves).
As a general matter, corporate law rules
constrain private ordering more strictly
than limited liability company rules, although the internal constituents in statutory
close corporations - like those formed un-

of incorporation provide otherwise, each
outstanding share, regardless of class, is
entitled to one vote on each matter voted
on at a shareholders' meeting." The parallel provision in the DGCL, Section 212,
similarly states that "[u]nless otherwise
provided in the certificate of incorporation
... , each stockholder shall be entitled to 1
vote for each share of capital stock held by
such stockholder."
The relevant uniform LLC law in the
United States, on which many state LLC
statutes are based, originally came from the
Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA).
The bias in partnership law (which originally was common law), as reflected in
Section 103 of the RUPA, is to generally al-
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low the partnership agreement to establish
the rules that govern the partners' relations
in and with the partnership. Consistent with
this preference for self-determination, Section 110(a) of the Revised Uniform Limited
Liability Company Act (RULLCA) gives
effect to internal governance rules for the
LLC contained in the operating agreement
among the LLC members, except in certain limited respects expressly set forth in
the statute. The RULLCA sets forth these
limited exceptions in Section 110(c), some
of which are immutable rules and some of
which are rules allowing for tailored modification of statutory default rules in the operating agreement. It is significant to note
in this context that operating agreements
may be written or oral and, unlike corporate charters, have no specified structure or
mandated contents. Although the RULLCA
and its predecessor uniform acts flip the
statutory presumption as to the location of
the operative rules to the agreement among
the venturers (from the corporate presumption that the statute includes the operative
rules) and allow for a more open form of
agreement, the net effect of the RULLCA
is not measurably different from that of the
corporate law: unless the parties agree otherwise, default rules in the statute govern
their conduct.
There are several key areas, however, in
which the RULLCA has begun to innovate
away from both corporate and partnership

law and toward a more pure freedom to
contract for governance rules. This trend is
exemplified by the absence in the RULLCA
of any express apparent agency authority
rule for members of a member-managed
LLCs. Section 301 of the RULLCA provides that "[a] member is not an agent of a
limited liability company solely by reason
of being a member." By contrast, Section
301 of the 1995 version of the Uniform
Limited Liability Company Act included a
default rule providing that
[e]ach member is an agent of the company
for the purpose of its business, and an act
of a member, including the signing of an
instrument in the company's name, for apparently carrying on in the ordinary course

the company's business or business of the
kind carried on by the company binds the
company, unless the member had no authority to act for the company in the particular matter and the person with whom the
member was dealing knew or had notice
that the member lacked authority.
The RULLCA implemented a similar
change with respect to the apparent authority of managers in a manager-managed
LLC (omitting express agency authority
for managers that was included in Section
301 of the predecessor ULLCA). The lack
of a statutory default rule in the RULLCA
defining the apparent authority of members
or managers allows LLC members to contract for the authority rules they desire in
their operating agreement. In the absence
of valid authority provisions in the operating agreement, the common law of agency
provides the necessary rules.
Delaware LLC law offers business venturers the most flexibility as to the rules
that govern their relations with each other
and the LLC. The Delaware Limited Liability Company Act (DLLCA) does not
distinguish between member-managed and
manager-managed LLCs and is silent as to
the apparent authority of any members or
managers that may be provided for in the
operating agreement. This silence exemplifies Delaware's strong policy favoring the
freedom of constituents in LLCs to contract
for their own governance rules. This policy
is drafted right into the DLLCA. Section
18-1101(b) of the DLLCA provides that
"[i]t is the policy of this chapter to give the
maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability
of limited liability company agreements."
This general provision summarizes and
guides interpretation of the DLLCA.
It is a "given" that freedom to contract
is more significant in LLCs than corporations. LLCs were created as a more highly
contractual alternative to the standardized,
statutory corporate form, while still offering business participants structural and
governance norms. In a world of rules that
balances contractual freedom against black
letter rules and foreseeable outcomes, the

LLC form favors freedom to contract over
certainty and predictability. Thus, harmonization regarding freedom of contract would
contradict a key rationale for the existence
of corporations and LLCs as two distinct
forms of entity and undermine the freedom of choice of entrepreneurs who desire
to form an entity rather than conduct their
business using contracts. We can justify the
general differences between corporate and
LLC law with respect to the freedom to
contract on this basis.
Is it possible that the freedom to contract
in the LLC form may reach a point of maximum utility? Although the idea may be a bit
far-fetched, there may be a time at which
LLC law extends freedom of contract to
such a great degree that there is no longer any measurable benefit to organizing a
business under the LLC form. Said another
way, as LLC law edges toward forcing or
strongly encouraging governance rulemaking through contracts among business venture participants and away from statutory
default rules, there may be less of a need
for LLC law. Business venturers certainly
are able to conduct business through contracts among themselves and with third
parties without the benefit of LLC law. Admittedly, however, as long as limited liability status is only obtainable through entity
formation, the LLC form will continue to
have substantial value for participants in
firms that do not want to organize as cor-

porations.

Fiduciary Duties
To codify, or not to codify? That is the
main question, when it comes to fiduciary
duty principles in entity law. Corporate law
has eschewed codifying fiduciary duties in
any great detail, preferring instead, at most,
to rely on a general concept (expressed in,
e.g., Sections 8.30(a) and 8.30(b) of the
MBCA) that corporate directors and officers are charged with acting in good faith,
in the best interest of the corporation, and
with due care. The DGCL does not even express this general notion, leaving the whole
of fiduciary duty law to judicial review.
Modem unincorporated entity laws, starting with the RUPA, have, however, codified
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I
exclusive or non-exclusive fiduciary duties
of loyalty and care, and provide for an obligation of good faith and fair dealing among
the constituents. Examples include Section
404 of the RUPA (providing that the only
two fiduciary duties of partners to each
other and the partnership are care and loyalty, as expressly defined) and Section 409
of the RULLCA (providing for nonexclusive duties of care and loyalty, as expressly
defined).
The trend in LLC law has been toward
broader fiduciary duties, less codification
of fiduciary duties, and more freedom of
contract in tailoring fiduciary duties. The
RULLCA, for instance, defines the duty
of care in Section 409(c) more broadly
than the predecessor ULLCA. The RULLCA definition encompasses a negligence
standard of care in addition to the previous
standard's inclusion of gross negligence,
willful misconduct, and knowing violation
of the law. In a bolder move, both the DLLCA and the American Bar Association's
Revised Prototype Limited Liability Company Act decline to codify fiduciary duties.
Instead, both allow members to freely provide for, define, and delimit fiduciary duties in the LLC's operating agreement (now
denominated in the DLLCA as a limited liability company agreement).
The freedom of contract with respect to
LLC fiduciary duties in Delaware has fos-

merchant, shall govern." (emphasis added).
Accordingly, although a limited liability
company agreement may limit or eliminate
fiduciary duties under Delaware law, if the
agreement remains silent as to fiduciary duties, common law fiduciary duties apply.
LLC fiduciary duty law is evolving toward freedom of contract. The rationalization of entity law rules governing fiduciary
duties, like those described above relating
to freedom of contract, involves considering both the value and the nature of certainty and predictability in business planning
and enforcement. This debate will naturally
influence the separation of corporate law
from LLC law and, perhaps, the continued
need for and existence of LLC law.
Policies underlying fiduciary duties are
different, however, from those underlying
other governance rules. Fiduciary duties
promote trust in co-venturers in entering
into business relationships with each other. They arose at common law to enforce
implicit promises in the relations between
legal actors. Accordingly, the failure to provide for default fiduciary duties in an LLC
statute should not necessarily mean, as it
may in the context of other statutorily constructed entity law rules, that no rule exists
- i.e., that business entity participants have
no fiduciary duties to each other.
Apart from the freedom to contract, there

tered an interesting debate that has been

is no support in existing policy or theory

need to harmonize entity law (which is, of

for different fiduciary duties for participants in different forms of legal entity. Alin Gatz Properties,LLC v. Auriga Capital though courts and legislatures categorize
Corp., 59 A.3d 1206 (Del. 2012), and Fee- fiduciary duties in an effort to clarify their
ley v. NHAOCG, LLC, 62 A.3d 649 (Del. meaning and provide certainty and predictCh. 2012). The debate concerns whether ability in business planning and enforcemembers or managers of an LLC have any ment, fiduciary duty doctrine is, at its core,
fiduciary duties if none are provided for in interstitial. It fills gaps in the more express
the limited liability company agreement. A principles that govern the structure of busirecent amendment to the DLLCA clarified ness entities and the manner in which their
that a court may continue to find that fidu- operations are governed. The existence of
ciary duties are applicable to LLC partici- statutory or common law fiduciary duties in
pants when no fiduciary duties are provided the absence of the clear, express limitation
for in the LLC agreement. Section 18-1104 or elimination of them supplies a foundaof the DLLCA, effective August 1, 2013, tional trust that incentivizes entrepreneurs,
provides that "[i]n any case not provided promoters, and financial backers to effifor in this chapter, the rules of law and ciently form and operate businesses. This
equity, including the rules of law and eq- is common to all relationships in business

course, state law) may be, and are, in fact,
different. The many variations in the ways
that states handle aspects of fundamental
change transactions in their entity law rules
(including variations in the availability of
shareholder-initiated dissolutions and the
availability of dissenters' rights for charter
amendments and in business combination
transactions) illustrates these policy differences. This means that forms of entity are
not the same in each state. State law differences offer venturers more choice in constructing their businesses but make the task
of rationalization more complex.
Other elements of complexity also confound the entity rationalization process.
Both federal corporate governance rules applicable to public entities (enacted through

played out in the judiciary in Delaware in
the past few years - perhaps most notably

uity relating to fiduciary duties and the law

firms and dictates harmonization of legal
rules across entities. The content of default
fiduciary duties should be the same across
all forms of entity.
Having said that, freedom of contract in
the LLC form should still be able to operate
in much the way that the DLLCA now provides (if not otherwise, as provided in, e.g.,
the RULLCA). Informed venturers with
legal capacity should be able to enter into
valid and binding contracts that vary statutory or common law fiduciary duties. They
may have other ways of supplying the trust
needed to engage in business together. It is
only where the contracts on fiduciary duties
are invalid or unenforceable, or where no
contractual provision on fiduciary duties is
made, that common law would or should
step in to fill gaps in the rules that govern
the relations among business entity participants.

Cone usion
The issues raised in this article provide
some food for thought on entity rationalization for legislators, practitioners, and
the judiciary through two examples. The
article does not address, however, several
important issues that exist in the overall entity rationalization debate. In particular, the
article does not address the notion that state
policy goals may differ in justifiable ways,
meaning that state judgments about the
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the federal securities laws and implemented by Securities and Exchange Commission regulation) and stock exchange rules
applicable to listed companies further complicate entity rationalization. Moreover,
none of the analysis in this article takes into
account whether the focus of the norms of
entity law match the evolving requirements
and preferences of participants in business
ventures.
Despite the complexity of the entity rationalization process, there is much to be
gained from a careful comparative analysis of entities within any individual state
in light of policy and theory - an analysis
that may not always be occurring when legal rules are debated in the legislature, in
judicial proceedings, and in the public atlarge. New entity laws have continued to
proliferate in the 21st century, with social
enterprise entity legislation - including the
enactment of laws providing for low-profit
limited liability companies, commonly
known as L3Cs, benefit corporations, and
other similar forms of entity - being a large
player in the current legislative adoption
game. Some of these laws represent only
minor adjustments to existing entity laws,
and the cost of their adoption may not result in palpable benefits for business venturers or the state. In some instances, the
articulated benefits of these statutes may
not be benefits at all. In many (if not most)

a limited set of distinct business entities that
well serve the needs of those who wish to
use them. That would be a desirable result.
Joan MacLeod Heminway is W.P.
Toms DistinguishedProfessor of Law
at the University of Tennessee College
of Law in Knoxville, Tennessee.
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cases, existing entity law can accomplish

the same objectives with - and sometimes
even without - small enhancements allowing for additional freedom of contract. In
those cases, a whole new entity law is not
needed. Legislative time is precious, and
we should not be squandering it on unnecessary statutes.
The accumulation of the information in
Mark Loewenstein's Part I article and this
article suggest that entity rationalization
should be part of ongoing debates regarding
the adoption of new forms of entity and the
amendment and interpretation of existing
entity law statutes. Similarities and differences among rules for different forms of entity should make sense in light of policy and
theory. Ultimately, if done properly, the entity rationalization process should generate
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